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Short abstract: In this paper, we inquire how the eternal tension between science and values 
has been tackled in philosophy of science by analysing three different strategies that have 
been used: (a) focussing on different kinds of values (e.g. epistemic vs. non-epistemic values) 
and allowing some of these kinds to be present in science (e.g. epistemic values); (b) 
stipulating the role values are allowed to play (e.g. an indirect, but not a direct role); and, (c) 
specifying a social procedure in order to deal with values in science.  
Recently, the distinction between the direct and indirect role values could play in 
science and expertise was elaborated extensively by Heather Douglas, allowing values to play 
an indirect role. We scrutinize Douglas’ account and claim that identifying the different roles of 
values in science faces similar problems as earlier philosophical accounts distinguishing kinds 
of values, cf. epistemic and non-epistemic values (see, e.g., Kuhn, McMullin and Laudan). The 
problems discussed concern (1) interpreting, (2) weighing, (3) variety of, and (4) distinguishing 
the kinds/roles of values in science.  
Furthermore, we investigate whether some of these problems, rather than by the 
kinds-of-values-approach or Douglas’ roles-of-values-approach, could be addressed by 
stipulating a social procedure in order to deal with values in science and expertise (e.g., Helen 
Longino’s demand for critical interaction respecting the four CCE-norms would be example of 
such an approach), or, whether combining two or all three of the strategies would help us 
developing a satisfying account of values in science. 
 
 
Long abstract:  
In this paper, we inquire how the eternal tension between science and values has been tackled in 
philosophy of science. We distinguish three strategies:  
(a) focussing on different kinds of values (e.g. epistemic vs. non-epistemic values) and allowing 
one of these kinds to be present in science (e.g. epistemic values);  
(b) stipulating the role values are allowed to play in science (e.g. an indirect, but not a direct role);  
(c) specifying a social procedure in order to deal with values in science.  
 
Recently, the distinction between a direct and indirect role values could play in science and expertise, 
an instance of strategy (b), has been elaborated extensively by Heather Douglas (2008, 2009). In 
making their judgments, scientists can and should embrace values as guidance, according to her, in 
considering the sufficiency of evidence, the weighing of uncertainty and the consequences of error, 
this is the legitimate indirect role of values. (Douglas 2008: 10; 2009: 96) Values should, however, not 
act as epistemic support or providing warrant, “as reasons for accepting or rejecting an empirical 
claim” (2008: 10), this is the unacceptable direct role of values.  
 
We will scrutinize Douglas’ account in our paper and we will claim that identifying the different roles of 
values in science faces similar problems as earlier philosophical accounts distinguishing kinds of 
values in science, i.e. epistemic and non-epistemic values. In this earlier debates, the epistemic values 
were considered acceptable as additional guidance for theory choice beyond logic and evidence in 
cases of competing theories. Several lists of such ‘acceptable’ epistemic values have been formulated, 
e.g., accuracy, consistency, predictive and explanatory scope, simplicity, fruitfulness (Kuhn, 1977: 
321-22); predictive accuracy, internal coherence, external consistency, unifying power, fertility, 
simplicity (McMullin, 1983: 15-16); truth, coherence, simplicity, predictive fertility, ... (Laudan, 1984: 
35). However, this kinds-of-values strategy faces at least four problems: 
(1) The interpretation of the values. The exact interpretation of every single one of the epistemic 
values seems contentious. 
(2) The weighing (and ranking) of values. If the different epistemic values cannot all be maximally 
addressed or satisfied simultaneously by any single theory, model or explanation, the question 
arises of how these different interests should be balanced or how they must be weighed against 
one another. 
(3) There is a variety of lists of acceptable values. There is no clear consensus about which values 
have to be included in the list of epistemic values ‘internal’ to science. 
(4) Distinguishing epistemic and non-epistemic values. The strict division or dichotomy between 
epistemic and non-epistemic interests has also come under attack. 
 
We claim that the role-of-values approach as developed by Douglas faces similar problems:  
(1) The interpretation of uncertainty – when an indirect role for values is allowed. According to 
Douglas, values are allowed (and needed) to play an indirect role when we do have a case of 
uncertainty: “If there is significant uncertainty and the consequences of error are clear, values are 
needed to decide whether the available evidence is sufficient to make the empirical claim.” 
(Douglas, 2009: 103) However, what is interpreted as a case of (un)certainty depends on an 
individual expert’s judgment. What if two experts have different values and a divergent view on 
what counts as uncertain?  
(2) The weighing of uncertainty: What counts as enough evidence, as (in)significant uncertainty? 
Won’t the assessment of which uncertainties surrounding a claim are insignificant, which are 
potentially significant but acceptable, and which are not acceptable, be subject to individual 
idiosyncrasies and values? 
(3) Variety qua uncertainty (and the consequences of error). The variety of understandings of 
uncertainty can be due to problems (1) and (2), but they might as well be the result of employing 
different theoretical frameworks. 
(4) Distinguishing the two roles of values: if uncertainty is to a large extent defined by the 
theoretical framework – which includes values providing epistemic support and guidance (the direct 
role) – on which the expert relies, the indirectness becomes very relative and the boundary 
between the direct and the indirect role very porous – where does the indirect role ends and the 
direct one starts? 
 
Each of these problems will be dealt with in more detail. Furthermore, we will investigate whether 
some of these problems, rather than by the kinds-of-values-approach or Douglas’ roles-of-values-
approach, could be addressed by stipulating a social procedure in order to deal with values in science 
and expertise, or, whether combining two or all three of the strategies would help us developing a 
satisfying account of values in science. A good account of dealing with values via social procedures 
can be found in Helen Longino’s (2002) procedural social epistemology. She presented it as a solution 
to the problems related to kinds of values (cf. her 1996), but it might also solve some of the problems 
of Douglas’ account as will be examined. 
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